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1 Introduction 
 
Powered by the daily reports of drowning refugees or ill-managed camps, uncoor- 
dinated or unfair border control, the issue of justice in immigration has become a 
well-established field of research (Carens 2013; Fine and Ypi 2016; Miller 2016; 
Sager 2016b). While almost every aspect of fairness is covered by the theory of 
migration, civic integration programs in general, and the language expectations in 
particular, have not yet received sufficient attention. In many democracies, the rules 
of such programs have been designed to become the new architecture of immigration 
policies, and the language requirement is used not only as part of the conditions 
for naturalization but also as a “pre-entry barrier” (Goodman 2011) used against 
migrants.1 
 
 
 
 
 
1We do not discuss the sovereign right of states to legalize or constitutionalize official or national 
languages; that is part of another debate on language rights, for “new minorities” or “historical 
nations” in particular Kymlicka (2001) and Kymlicka and Banting (2006). Our empirical starting 
point is a “conventional view,” namely, the current  situation in which most states have  official  
or national languages and legitimately control the access to public institutions, citizenship, and 
territory. These are considered as “club goods,” e.g., excludable while not necessarily rivalrous 
goods (Carens 2013; Buchanan 1965). We however question the legitimacy of states, when 
languages are considered as excludable club goods. See n. 6. 
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We usually fail to see the conceptual continuum between immigration on the 
one hand and application for citizenship on the other hand;2 the academic literature 
therefore seems to be divided into two  strands of  research. A  broad debate on  
the legitimacy of boundaries on  the one  hand, exploring the  rights and  wrongs 
of political states to restrict entrance and (full) participation in the democratic 
polity,3 and another debate rather concerned with the content of pre-entry barriers 
for denizens or civic integration programs on the other hand. Although they overlap 
in important areas, namely, when they discuss the status of migrants compared to 
citizens (the rights and duties of citizenship versus admittance or granting of long- 
term residency); when they assess the fairness of rationing or selecting migrants; 
or when they evaluate the type of compliance with domestic rules states require 
before granting entrance, residency, or citizenship, the debates are led from different 
perspectives. The former is concerned with the large picture (under what conditions 
is a political state justified in restricting immigration?), whereas the latter rather 
looks at the nature of the demands on behalf of the migrants and their compatibility 
with liberal-democratic policies. Depending on the countries, the requirements 
cover political, economic, cultural, and moral aspects of residency and citizenship. 
This chapter deals with one item of these requirements, in our view a particularly 
problematic one: language skills. 
Pre-entry checklists as well as citizenship tests usually require immigrants or 
would-be citizens to pass language tests or to undergo (verified) language training 
in some form. Language testing has so far received poor attention in political 
theory. Compared to the sophistication of the tools used to debate the fairness of 
boundaries (Benhabib 2004; Abizadeh 2008; Pevnick 2011) or the legitimacy of 
testing knowledge of national history, values, or political institutions (Brooks 2016), 
the evaluation of language skills as a significant contribution to social cohesion, 
stability, durability, and the democratic liveliness of the host society is either under- 
conceptualized or non-explicit. 
Our paper aims at questioning the rationale for language testing in immigration 
policies. Although we consider knowledge of the host country’s language(s) useful 
and meaningful for both the migrant and the host society in terms of autonomy, 
social mobility, non-domination, and upward mobility (Bleakley and Chin 2010; 
Adserà and Pytlikovà 2015; Grin and Gazzola 2013; Borjas 1999), we argue that 
mandatory language testing cannot be justified. Our purpose in this chapter is to 
offer justifications for rejecting language as a legitimate tool for controlling the 
borders and to regulate citizenship of a liberal democracy. 
In this chapter, we focus on fair  immigration and naturalization policies, not  
on fair language policies per se.4 Our working definition of language is min- 
 
 
2The most recent and convincing attempt to bridge the gap between immigration and citizenship 
is De Schutter and Ypi (2015). 
3We are concerned only with democracies in this chapter. 
4Much has been written about the fairest balance between official and minority languages and 
about the services immigrants, residents, and minorities can and should expect from the state. 
  
imal and quite straightforward: we embrace a soft instrumentalist definition of 
language (De Schutter 2007: 9), acknowledging its importance for identity as an 
individual speaker or as a member of a community, while giving priority to the 
political interests either not to be coerced into learning a language or to promote   
a homogeneous speech community. If language is part of our cultural identity  
(and consequently a sign of membership in particular speech communities), it is 
also, maybe primarily, a tool to connect people and interact meaningfully within 
political communities. We ask whether a common language, though useful for a 
lively deliberative democracy and for self-government, is a necessary condition for 
democratic debate, and whether it should be enforced through the control of access 
to territory and citizenship. 
We are interested in the reasons why the  evaluation  of  linguistic  skills  is 
used to regulate immigration and  shape  the  degree of  societal  pluralism,  and 
we argue that testing the language skills of immigrants is generally unnecessary 
because the tests fail to live up to their goals. They are inefficient in creating 
linguistically homogeneous communities, unnecessary in terms of democratic 
deliberation, and unfair because they aim at an additional “political” competence 
that is not required for citizens. Following the distinction used by Carens (2013) 
between requirements and incentives, we will argue against mandatory testing of 
linguistic skills but in favor of educational incentives to learn the main (official 
state) language(s). 
We start by describing the political context and  the  normative justifications  
for testing immigrants in European  countries.  We  then  question  the  rationale 
for citizenship tests in general and  contrast  the  criticism  they  inspire  on  the 
one hand with the consensus that membership in a demos remains a substantive 
commitment, which ought to be expressed through language proficiency on the 
other hand. In Sect. 2, we look at the different types of immigrants who are 
subjected to the tests and challenge the argument that language proficiency should 
be mandatory. We argue that even if mastering the common language(s) is desirable 
for the newcomers themselves, since they have a reasonable interest in social 
mobility and employability, this does not per se justify the coercion linguistic tests 
represent. We argue that neither nationalists nor liberals can justify this coercion 
and explain why their arguments eventually conflate language proficiency and 
political competence. In Sect. 3, we provide an argument in favor of free language 
training as a democratic right. Admission should be granted without pre-entry 
proficiency tests, but once admitted, immigrants and applicants for citizenship 
should have a right to free language training, in order to take part in the self- 
governing polity. 
 
 
 
 
This is not the place to discuss these matters. For an overview of the literature, see Kymlicka and 
Patten’s Introduction to their Language Rights and Political Theory (2003); more recently, see 
Alcade (2015). 
 
 
2 Citizenship Tests: E Pluribus Unum? 
 
Given the “fact of pluralism” (Rawls 1996: 188) and what Ronald  Schmidt  
(2014: 396) has called “ontological multilingualism,” the general goal of liberal 
democracies is to define a “common good” that encompasses the scope of an 
acceptable, agreed upon form of pluralism. The problem of sustaining a fair 
democratic community while remaining open to social, religious, and political 
diversity and accommodating minorities has mainly been tackled from the inside, 
namely, through the lens of cultural liberalism, multiculturalism, or status group 
legal pluralism (Tamir 1993; Kymlicka 2001; Appiah 2005; Song 2007).5 
Shifting the focus to admission of aliens and naturalization policies allows to get 
a better picture of what kind of common good democracies really value and how 
they set their priorities in defining whom to admit and whom to exclude. When 
states issue specific requirements for newcomers (as they have been doing in the 
last decades), they generally express distrust toward pluralism and immigration, but 
they also explicitly spell out values or practices deemed important to be sustained, 
protected, and agreed upon, namely, via citizenship tests and contracts (Barker 
2015). The content of the common good varies among democracies but also vis-à- 
vis the type of newcomer (states typically differentiate between refugees, asylum 
seekers, and applicants for residency or citizenship). Lately liberal democracies 
seem less concerned with defining their primordial, unique, or distinctive cultural 
identity substantively and rather factor important political values into (immigration) 
laws. These political values are not less cultural in a sense, but newcomers are not, 
in principle, required to let go of their genuine identities to be considered “one of 
us” but should instead express loyalty to a set of political values of the host country 
and, among these, language. 
For several years now, European countries run citizenship or immigration tests. 
The aim is to clarify and to monitor the process immigrants have to undergo in 
order to become (long-term) residents or for purposes of naturalization. They have 
been used in the USA, Canada, and famously in Australia (Lövenheim and Gazit 
2009) and have now been adopted by various EU countries (Van Oers et al. 2010). 
The general distrust vis-à-vis religious and cultural diversity; the global anxiety 
about religious fanaticism, cultural diversity, and anti-multiculturalism, alongside 
with social and economic crises; and a general skepticism vis-à-vis our welfare 
institutions probably contribute to explain the wave of testing throughout Europe 
(Parekh 2006; Bigo 2009; Kymlicka 2012; Parkin 2013).6 
 
 
5And the literature on global justice of course; but again this is not the place to discuss this in a 
more thorough fashion. 
6Languages are, in principle, non-excludable goods with positive network externalities (De 
Swaan 2001), but citizens and members of political communities may view their (national, 
official) language as excludable “club goods,” in other words restricted to a specific constituency 
or accessible only via cost-sharing, in our case the material and symbolic efforts (language 
acquisition) to be carried out by newcomers. 
  
On the surface, these tests are designed, on behalf of the state, to assess the 
willingness and the ability of residents or would-be citizens to become members of 
the political community (of the citizenry in the case of the former, of the demos in 
the case of the latter (Bauböck 2015a)). On behalf of the immigrant, taking the test 
is supposed to be a proof of sincerity and good will, the desire to learn some basic 
cultural and political facts about the host country, and/or more substantially a wish 
to significantly participate and succeed in the community’s social, economic, and 
political life (Mason 2014). 
Given that democracies are ought to duly justify their practices to the affected or 
subjected individuals,7 how do they justify testing citizenship? 
The normative justifications range from selectiveness and skill sensitivity  to 
the legitimacy of evaluating compatibility with European values of democracy, 
equality, and liberty. Politically, they are supposed to have positive side effects on 
European public opinions, generally hostile to immigration from outside the EU 
(European Commission 2014: 33). In order to satisfy these a priori goals of the 
receiving state, immigrants supposedly need language skills. Language seems to be 
the metonymy of a whole range of other qualities and values. The meritocratic or 
egalitarian advantage of the tests, especially language tests, is the ability to evaluate 
these skills objectively and neutrally. Although none of these expectations runs 
against broadly defined liberal principles, the question whether language skills are 
functional requirements or substantive prerequisites remains open. 
Let us now try to disaggregate the justificatory arguments of the tests. If 
citizenships tests are meant to objectively evaluate to what extent a newcomer 
understands and complies with the state’s national values, citizenship is framed as 
a reward based on objectified criteria. For several reasons, however, the neutrality 
argument does not hold. 
From a civic-democratic fairness point of view, citizenship tests indeed came 
under attack from different sides. The consensus among critiques is that there is 
something unfair about too “thick” requirements, e.g., citizenship tests that expect 
thorough knowledge of domestic and sometimes parochial culture. “Cultural” 
citizenship tests, enacted in the Netherlands targeting Muslims, for example, are 
unfair by any standard (De Leeuw and Van Wichelen 2012); so are the German 
tests when they expect familiarity with past victories of national soccer teams; and 
the British version is unfair too when expected knowledge of “facts that are purely 
trivial and lack practical significance” (Brooks 2013)8 is required as opposed to 
“purely political” tests (Joppke 2007). 
 
 
 
7For various interpretations of this criterion of democratic legitimacy, see, for instance, Dahl 
(1970), Shapiro (1999a), Lopez-Guerra (2005), Beckman (2006), Goodin (2007), Benhabib 
(2011), and Näsström (2011). 
8For instance, as reported by Brooks (2013), the first test expected immigrants to know the birth 
(1759) and death (1851) dates of Sake Dean Mahomet, credited with opening the UK’s first curry 
house in 1810. Participants were also required to know the name and nationality of his wife (Jane 
Daly, Irish) and the street where his restaurant was situated (George Street, London). 
 
 
Furthermore, justifications for testing conceal a series of tacit ideologies, despite 
the claim for a new, neutral tool of evaluation, such as forms of protective 
nationalism calling for pre-entry barriers in order to insulate the cultural identity  
of a given society, to limit family reunification, or to “control the level and 
composition of immigration” (Goodman 2011). Tests are the last avatars of the myth 
of integration or assimilation into ex ante existing cultures and of the ideology of 
monocultural and monolingual communities (Blackledge 2009). 
The nationalistic premise is obviously incompatible with neutral assessment of 
citizenship claims. As in all nationalistic polities, only members are entitled to enjoy 
full political partnership. But the tacit ideology or the nationalistic routine often 
ignores that coherent language communities are precisely the result of nationalizing 
policies, of the progressive (and coercive) integration of peripheral languages into 
the official tongue, and not an a priori characteristic of political communities. 
France is probably the worst-case scenario of such linguistic nationalizing policies 
(Busekist 2004, 2012), Québec, in a milder nationalistic way, rations its immigrants 
according to language skills. 
What about the claim that sharing a language is useful for both parties and that 
language testing is consequently more acceptable than citizenship tests in general? 
Among academics there seems to be a “consensus [ . . .  ] that requiring language 
does not push citizenship tests across the threshold of discriminatory, illiberal 
practices” (Goodman 2010: 36). In other words, once we get rid of the cultural  
and historical questions—the thick cultural requirements—language expectations 
in citizenship tests are compatible with liberal evenhandedness (Carens 2013: 183; 
Benhabib 2011: 164). How convincing is this argument? Is it true that one can isolate 
language requirements from value requirements? 
In France, for example, language appears as early as article 2 of the French 
Constitution (la langue de la république est le français) and entails significant 
duties on behalf of social and political actors and institutions (Busekist 2007). 
Language also plays a performative role and serves as an indicator of belonging 
and of “frenchness” (Busekist 2014). The (still powerful) nation-language-identity 
equation can be traced back to the French revolution and the proto-linguistic 
policies carried out by its proponents (Busekist 2004). Language proficiency is 
wed to other cultural and legal expectations, and the “Welcome and Integration 
Contract” [Contrat d’accueil et d’intégration]9 does not say otherwise. Whether 
 
 
9The signature of the “contract” is supposed  to be the necessary  (but  not sufficient)  condition 
to obtain a 10-year residence card or to renew a temporary resident card. The contract clearly 
states what is expected from the migrant (which set of values she needs to accept) and the 
resources the state avails for integration.  The contract  lists the values  of the French  republic  
on the one hand (indivisibility, laïcité, gender equality, mandatory schooling for children under 
age 16, French language) and the requisites for integration on the other hand (civic instruction, 
language courses, medical checkup, professional skills assessment). There is no language test per 
se, but it is acknowledged that the newcomer has to learn the language, and the evaluation of this 
ability through official interviews will heavily count in the decision of the public official to grant a 
residence permit. There is in fact no need for an official test, since the entire process is based on the 
embeddedness of the “republican” values in French language, sometimes creating clear situations 
  
this exclusionary approach to granting citizenship is due to the fear of numbers 
and alien cultural norms of migrants or to the fear of Anglophone hegemony is yet 
another debate. However, the francophonie argument is more commonly used in the 
French context to legitimize public policies regulating the production and diffusion 
of cultural goods (music, movies, etc.). The situation in Québec is quite different. 
Here again, the “special relationship” between language and  given territories 
is a historical and ideological legacy: on the one hand, we know that building 
states and nations has been carried out through cultural and political assimilation, 
language rationalization, and systematic exclusion of minority languages (Laitin 
2000; Gellner 1983), but we fail to acknowledge—scholars and practitioners alike 
(Goodman 2010)—that we are the willing followers of exactly those policies on the 
other hand, assimilation into the normative culture through the official language(s). 
Empirically, we know that purely monolingual polities belong to the past, but 
normatively we seem to be caught in the trap of methodological nationalism, despite 
our commitment to post-national or global demoi and despite our commitment to 
pluralism. 
[The basic outline of liberal nationhood should] include relatively easy access to citizenship 
after, say three to five years of residency, with minimal tests of national integration, includ- 
ing knowledge of the national language, knowledge of national history and institutions, and 
an oath of loyalty to the country and its constitution(Emphasis added) (Kymlicka 2006: 
136–137) 
So, is language testing compatible with liberal-democratic pluralism? Can 
language testing avoid the traps of promoting a single conception of the good life? 
Is a polity entitled to condition access to its relevant institutions through language 
testing, or must we bite the bullet and admit that language testing belongs to the 
legitimate (and indeed unavoidable) policies of modern states? 
These questions have been partially answered by sidestepping the dilemma: 
firstly, as De Schutter (2007, 17) recalls, “employing a neutral hands-off approach 
is unworkable with regard to linguistic diversity. [ ... ] [I]n making policies on, 
among other things, education or simply courtroom practices, states unavoidably 
have to make linguistic decisions: fully a-linguistic state policies simply do not 
exist.” Secondly, expecting language proficiency does not violate liberal neutrality 
principles regarding individual lives, since the specificity of language is its 
“exteriority,” as Joppke puts it. It is not about the inner beliefs of people; it is 
therefore compatible with liberal forms of loyalty (Bauböck and Joppke 2010). 
Finally, learning a new language is “capacity-enhancing, it does not deprive the 
individual of anything, least their ‘identity’.” 
Proficiency in the official tongue is hence considered to be a fair expectation on 
behalf of the (nation) state, rather than a specific political competence or a sign of 
cultural affinity even among the defenders of open or porous borders. Consequently, 
language proficiency is a legitimate criterion for controlling access to citizenship or 
 
of discrimination. Hachimi Alaoui and Pélabay (2013) give the example of a veiled woman who, 
despite a flawless accent, will have fewer chances than “white” and apparently secular Canadians 
with a very heavy accent. 
 
 
nationality from the point of view of the state. For migrants, host-country language 
skills may come with a cost as the means and opportunities to sustain their native 
languages vary greatly among democracies. 
Interestingly, the consensus on desired language proficiency among scholars is 
not tied to any specific commitment to liberal, republican, or communitarian values. 
There seems to be a general agreement that membership in a demos remains a 
substantive commitment, which ought to be expressed through linguistic fluency. 
Republicans, as in France, are very straightforward about an intrinsic link between 
language and republican values, linguistic practice, and political praxis (Busekist 
2004). On the liberal end of scholarship, Carens (2013: 183) sees “no reason for 
objecting to the use of linguistic competence as one factor in the selection of 
immigrants [emphasis added],” and Benhabib (2011: 164) argues that once the 
“right to membership” is “publicly and openly formulated, non-discriminatory, and 
compatible with international human rights agreements,” then “other  conditions 
of membership such as language fluency may be plausibly stipulated [emphasis 
added].” On the cultural-liberal-multicultural end, authors such as Kymlicka (2001: 
25), who promotes integration into a “societal culture” based on “common language 
and social institutions [emphasis added],” proficiency in the national language is 
also a necessary condition, among others, for citizenship. And even the dialogical 
or deliberation-based model of the political community tacitly or explicitly involves 
a common tongue (Euben 2007). 
In  short, aspiring to  an inclusive society of  equal and participative citizens   
de facto creates a  linguistic barrier between those who can literally take part in  
the “(liberal) conversation” and the others (Ackerman 1980: 95).10 The deceitful 
paradox of this line of argumentation (crossing ideal theory of open borders with an 
ideal definition of democracy) is then the following: sharing a common language (or 
languages) is the necessary clause for a lively participatory domestic democracy but 
also the rationale for drawing boundaries and excluding those who have a language 
deficiency (Kunnan 2012). 
In short, we challenge the consensus among liberals, liberal culturalists, and 
republicans on language testing, by providing a more powerful yet equally liberal 
argument against it. A liberal democracy cannot duly justify language testing  
since it creates  an  unfair burden on  non-native speakers. Even if  an  immigrant 
is not a refugee and has the  choice  to  move into  one  specific  country rather 
than another (Miller (2015) distinguishes immigrants along these lines), we argue 
 
 
10As one anonymous reviewer argues, one could say that this linguistic barrier does exist only 
until the immigrants learn the common language. But this hints to yet another problem, relating 
to the social equality of members, not the inequality between immigrants and citizens. Forms of 
discrimination continue to occur even when the language is well known; foreign/regional accents 
or the mastery of linguistic repertoires will be met by social or cultural discrimination (Bourdieu 
1982). We should therefore distinguish between inequalities at an early stage of entrance on the 
territory where the lawmaking citizenry has an impact on the design of immigration laws and 
structural inequalities within the citizenry, namely, between those who speak the normative tongue 
and those who do not. 
  
that we owe plausible justifications to those who are affected by coercion at our 
borders (Abizadeh 2008), that these justifications are not satisfactory so far, and 
that language testing distributes the burden inequitably among applicants, in other 
words fails the equal treatment clause if tests are mandatory. The burden is indeed 
“distributed unequally amongst applicant citizens, since the costs of additional 
language learning will vary according to linguistic background” (Shorten 2010: 
111). 
 
 
3 The Problem with Language Proficiency as a Sign 
of Political Competence 
 
In order to make our argument, we will now look at the different types of immigrants 
who are subjected to the tests. In the last section, we will then provide a positive 
argument in favor of language training as a right as opposed to testing as a 
requirement. 
Let us first consider foreigners who aspire to enter the state and are subjected to 
language tests prior to any contact with the host  society. In our view,  the status  
of refugee or asylum seekers  trumps any  other entrance condition in  the  name  
of human rights and the obligation to assist (Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees, UNHCR, 1951). There is no a priori need of cultural assimilation, nor any 
need for specific knowledge of the receiving state, consequently of language, since 
the goal is to protect vulnerable individuals.11 Furthermore, in order to avoid any 
form of domination, it seems obvious that the host country would have to provide 
interpreters and translators to be sure that their claim is properly made and heard. 
There are a posteriori Charter duties regarding language for the receiving state, and 
there may be a genuine interest for the refugee to learn the host country’s language. 
But there cannot be an a priori obligation justified on fair terms. 
We should add that language testing for refugees is often used to push a specific 
political agenda, hostile to immigrants from specific origins. There is evidence that 
language testing (more precisely language analysis) is primarily used to determine 
the geographical origins of the refugees, in order to evaluate the truthfulness of their 
claim to political asylum. While citizenship tests  aim at evaluating the potential  
of integration into the host country, linguistic analysis looks at the genuineness of 
the migrant’s demands. Obtaining refugee status generally depends on the locus  
of origin and the fact that she faces an imminent danger in her home society. 
Language analysts are called in to identify the accent of the claimants in order to 
prove or disprove a genuine claim of persecution. But as MacNamara and Shohamy 
(2008) write, “linguists have raised concerns about the naïve ways in which the 
 
 
11This is very much in line with a general consensus regarding refugees and asylum seekers, 
although there is an ongoing discussion about alternative destinations: refugees and asylum seekers 
have a right to enter a state but not necessarily the state they have chosen (Miller 2015). 
 
 
link between ways of speaking and speakers’ origins are often investigated, as well 
as how the conclusions of these investigations are often used in decisions about 
speakers’ claims to asylum” (see also Eades 2009 and more generally Fassin 2013). 
Language testing is even more relevant for the ordinary admission of immi- 
grants.12 For liberal nationalists, as we have mentioned, taking language tests 
could be a fair sign of willingness to take part in the political life of this or that 
specific country since a claim to immigrate is supposed to be specific and relational: 
freedom of movement should encompass an adequate range of possible countries of 
migration, rather than the entire world (Miller 2007: 207). 
Liberal nationalists are committed to the rule of law and a healthy welfare  
state. As nationalists, they believe in the legitimacy of protecting “shared beliefs 
and mutual commitments” in order to foster trust, cooperation, solidarity, and 
mutual protection and a right to a specific territory that is “marked off from other 
communities by its distinct public culture” (Miller 1995: 27). As liberals, they are 
committed to justice, and they believe that the proper functioning of a self-governing 
state should include mechanisms of adjudication between competing claims, rules of 
reciprocity, and justification: “Justice in immigration requires that the policy chosen 
should be legitimate, but it requires more than that—for instance [ . . .  ] that it does 
not discriminate between prospective immigrants on unjust grounds” (Miller 2015: 
392). 
The receiving state is hence entitled to require immigrants “to absorb some 
aspects of national culture as a condition of being admitted to citizenship” (Miller 
2010: 250). Incentives are not enough, because, according to Miller, the  interest 
of immigrants in learning the language or  to  apprehend  the  political  culture 
may conflict with their interest in protecting traditional family values, ancestral 
languages, or communitarian ties. Consequently, “the policy [ . . .  ] of making access 
to citizenship conditional on passing a test, that requires, for example, a working 
knowledge of the national language, and some familiarity with the history and 
institutions of the country in question, can be defended on these grounds” (ibid.). 
But doesn’t this argument ignore the interests of immigrants? The nationalist logic 
of the argument gives unquestioned priority to the values of the receiving state, as 
if culture and language were unified and territorially fixed once and for all (Sager 
2016a).13 
Let’s nevertheless assume that language is indeed part of the public culture or 
rather that the public culture is expressed in a certain language and that without 
 
 
12For the sake of thoroughness, we should also mention tourists who have to apply for a visa in 
order to visit a country. There is no need to argue that language proficiency cannot be a condition 
for obtaining such a visa, since it would defeat the purpose of an economically efficient tourism. 
As Robert Dahl argues (1989), transients  have  no claim to participate in local politics since  
they will not endure the consequences of their participation; the brevity of their stay and their 
own unwillingness to take part socially or politically in the society make any form of linguistic 
requirement irrelevant. 
13We referred to Buchanan’s argument about excludable club goods earlier (see n. 1 and 6). The 
nationalistic logic we address here neatly fits his model. 
  
a certain level of proficiency, integration is bound to fail. Instrumentally, being 
proficient in the receiving state’s tongue would furthermore give the applicant’s 
claim more weight as his potential compatibility and compliance with the host 
culture is measurable—at least idiomatically. However, even if we accept the idea 
that cultural affinity measured by language is valuable both for the immigrant and 
the host country (in terms of employability, personal autonomy, future participation, 
shared civic culture, upward mobility), it is not clear why language proficiency and 
language training should be mandatory, neither for family reunification14 nor for 
permanent residence. In other words, liberal nationalists may be right in identifying 
language as one of the building blocks of citizenship, but they do not offer a proper 
justification for coercive testing. 
Liberal nationalists need to offer a coherent justification as to why testing 
immigrants is required. We know that (language) integration is a process (Durkheim 
1975; Portes 1995; Fishman 2012) and cannot be a desert-based privilege sanctioned 
by a test. The paradoxical logic at play here is that one needs to be already integrated 
(linguistically) in order to be considered fit for (political) integration. Languages are 
learnable, and language training is useful, but contact with native speakers probably 
remains the best way to acquire a new language. Pre-entry barriers therefore make 
no sense if we look at processes and timelines, learning, and acquisition, instead of 
photographs of the migrant skills taken the day they file their application. 
Finally, language tests for would-be nationals are more plausible, since citizen- 
ship or nationality allegedly requires more loyalty, more rights, and more  duties. 
It also seems more legitimate to expect active participation from people who have 
been living in the host country for several years (although this is self-fulfilling in 
most cases: residents who have been living in the host country usually master the 
official language(s)). 
The ways in which citizenship is tested  are good indicators for the political  
and normative understanding of citizenship. Ricky van Oers, for example (Van 
Oers et al. 2010), distinguishes three types of citizenship and analyzes how tests 
embody one or the other. Whether citizenship is defined as a legal status (liberalism), 
an activity (republicanism), or an identity (communitarianism), tests  differ  and 
are more or less culturally laden. We have written that for liberals, republicans, 
communitarians, or nationalists alike, linguistic tests are legitimate, because they 
express either the ability to actively participate politically or are signs of loyalty  
to the national culture and solidarity. Language proficiency is therefore highly 
desirable both for future citizens, because they can interact (autonomy) and take 
part in the political culture (deliberation), and for the polity, because it fosters 
cooperation and solidarity and ensures the sustainability of the domestic (political) 
culture. And we have argued that the desirability of having (a) common/official 
 
14As Carens (2013: 188) puts it: “Both the immigrants and the wider community will be much 
better off if the immigrants learn the official language. But these considerations do not justify the 
creation of barriers to the entry of immediate family members. The right of human beings to live 
with their immediate family members imposes a moral limit on the state’s right simply to set its 
admissions policy as it chooses.” 
 
 
language(s) can be shared by the newcomers themselves since they have an interest 
in social mobility and employability (Blackledge 2009; Kahn 2004). But this does 
not per se justify the coercion that linguistic tests represent. Wishing that citizens 
speak the same language (or have at least one language in common) is quite different 
from coercing individuals to pass a linguistic test that conditions the distribution of 
membership. 
In all these situations, tests conflate language proficiency and political com- 
petence, e.g., the specific ability to participate meaningfully in the host society’s 
political life. If we take language proficiency as an a priori condition for membership 
for granted, there is no political participation without language proficiency, and 
reversely, political participation depends on  a  shared  language. This  argument  
is made in particular by proponents of a regional or global lingua franca. The 
assumption being that without such a common language, democratic deliberations 
are bound to fail or to exclude significant parts of the demos. But democratic 
participation is not related to any specific competences. Political scientists have 
long abandoned the belief that political competence is  an  individual “quality”  
that a policy maker (or any scholar for the same matter) can confidently evaluate 
(Blondiaux 2007; Landemore 2013; Landemore and Elster 2012); and political 
philosophers generally reject the Platonic ideal of competence in the name of 
democracy (Elkin and Soltan 1999). The very idea of testing proficiency leans on 
the ideal of a competent citizen, whose competence justifies participation. On the 
other side of the spectrum, deliberative theories of democracy show that competence 
is a collective endeavor that comes into existence through participation rather than 
beforehand (Manin 1987). But as we mentioned earlier, these theories also rely on 
an idealized monolingual forum where language proficiency is considered as an a 
priori competence (Schmidt 2014). Everything we know about migration precisely 
questions this and pushes deliberative theories to acknowledge that proficiency is  
a tacit competence that excludes a minority which is affected by the outcomes of 
deliberation. Competence should hence be analyzed as a collective issue: although 
it is important to be well-informed in order to participate, there are many ways to be 
informed in other languages than the official or common one.15 The romanticized 
view of general deliberation where everyone speaks in a virtual agora is far too 
high an expectation (Shapiro 1999b). Social interactions and public discussions  
do matter for a democracy to work properly, but there is no reason for making 
 
 
15The issue of translation policies or of “translational justice” (Meylaerts 2011) is too far reaching 
for the scope of this chapter. The debate about rights (and accompanying public policies) to 
translation services has been going on for a while and has not been settled. Reine Meylaerts 
(2011) is right when she writes that “there is no language policy without a translation policy,” 
and this is true in multilingual polities as well as for immigration policies. Translational justice is 
relevant for participatory democracy and non-domination because citizens should have a right to 
effectively communicate with the official authorities. Demands for translation services classically 
include legal translators (a claim must be properly heard) or multilingual ballots (participation). 
Current debates include linguistic challenges faced on a daily base: access to bureaucratic services 
healthcare, interaction with schools for parents with children, etc. 
  
language proficiency a necessary condition for being a proper (a good—normatively 
defined) citizen. Language competence and political competence are two different 
types of skills, but language testing in citizenship contracts juxtaposes and conflates 
them. A routine social life might provide enough basic information (international 
media, neighbors, schools and parents organizations, associations, etc.) to be a well- 
informed citizen (Khubchandani 1997; Rodriguez 2006). 
 
 
4 Teaching Instead of Testing 
 
It is true nevertheless that language skills are enabling and that linguistic exclusion 
should not lead to situations of helplessness? Individuals should have access to 
language training in order to avoid domination (lack of autonomy) and humiliation 
(disparity of esteem). In this section, we will argue in favor of free language training 
as a democratic right.16 Language disadvantages are detrimental to democratic 
equality and therefore to democratic participation. The argument for parity of 
participation is usually made in support of official common languages to foster a 
healthy “talkcentric” (Dryzek 1990) participatory territorial or national democracy; 
but parity of participation thanks to a common language is also supported by 
lingue franche proposals for “Europe and for the world” (Van Parijs 2011). Global 
egalitarian justice is better achieved in a common idiom, ideally connecting all 
citizens.17 
A convincing account of the proper trade-off between liberal principles and 
principles of democratic coherence is Rainer Bauböck’s stakeholder model (2007, 
2009, 2015a) combined with what he calls the “political value of languages” 
(Bauböck 2015b). He argues that the test for the legitimacy of boundaries “cannot be 
which border is more conducive to delivering social justice. We need to ask instead 
 
 
16One could say, as one reviewer did, that there is no such thing a “free language training.” But the 
same way public school is generally free of charge and financed by taxes, we argue that language 
training could equally be free and paid by the taxpayers who are the future citizens taking these 
classes. Expecting migrants to “give something back” for these courses would actually be like 
preventing emigration for citizens who have been trained in public schools. Distributional systems 
are not based on a strict reciprocal relation; there is room for delayed forms of loyalty and gratitude. 
Another argument could be made based on the idea of basic interests: education and language 
training concern basic interests of individuals and may be more or less unconditionally provided. 
This is why France, for instance, has a universal healthcare coverage for all residents, and police 
forces protect anyone in danger on its territory, regardless of the identity of the victims and without 
inquiring whether she is a citizen or a taxpayer. 
17The global lingua franca (English) is tempered by coercive territorial linguistic regimes in 
order to sustain more vulnerable national or regional languages. The reason for sheltering these 
languages, and the reason for language communities to “grab a territory” in Van Parijs’ words, is 
justice related: individuals feel attached to their native tongues and may feel disparaged by living 
in the shade of greater languages: “In a just society, people must not be stigmatized, despised, 
disparaged or humiliated by virtue of their collective identity” (Van Parijs 2011: 119). 
 
 
which territorial arrangement accommodates competing claims for self-government 
in such a way that it deserves to be supported by all” (Bauböck 2015b: 214). 
But let’s start with the political value of languages. In a piece dedicated to the 
critique of Van Parijs’ territorial principle as a compensation for disparity of esteem 
felt by speakers of minority languages, Bauböck justifies territoriality in a useful 
way for our purpose. Instead of supporting territoriality and coercive language 
policies within given boundaries for the sake of social support for self-respect, he 
rightly notes that languages are foremost tools for self-government. Establishing 
(a) particular language(s) in a given polity is hence “the legitimate outcome of 
democratic procedures that have been suitably constrained by linguistic freedoms 
and minority rights” (Bauböck 2015b: 214), and not an a priori requirement for 
linguistic justice. He endorses an instrumental account of languages that does not 
impede on identity issues, since these are also framed in egalitarian democratic 
terms (identity claims are morally equal but constrained by legitimate rules of 
democratic self-government). He also seems to reject the fact that individual 
language rights are the building blocks of coercive territorial language regimes: it is 
rather that a language regime is a democratic choice “constrained by, but not derived 
from individual language rights” (Bauböck 2015b: 222; see also Peled 2011). In 
short, languages are tools for building self-governing policies. Self-government in 
that sense is the independent variable (with language as a tool), whereas language 
(as an identity marker) is the dependent variable. We hence ought to test the 
legitimacy of language laws by “asking whether they are the result of legitimate 
exercise of self-government powers” (Bauböck 2015b: 221). 
Let’s now turn to the “stakeholder principle”: 
It relies on two assumptions. The first one is that individuals have a basic interest in  
[such] membership both for instrumental reasons (in order to gain protection of their 
fundamental rights) and intrinsic reasons (because membership contributes to their self- 
respect  and  equality of respect  by others).  The  second  assumption  is that  citizens of  
a self-governing polity share at least a presumptive collective interest in preserving its 
autonomy and contributing to its flourishing. The stakeholder principle links these two 
assumptions by proposing that those and only those individuals have a claim to membership 
whose individual autonomy and wellbeing is linked to the collective self-government and 
flourishing of a particular polity. (Bauböck 2015a: 9 [emphasis added]) 
On first sight, the combination of the two arguments seems to be a powerful jus- 
tification for the legitimacy of language requirements: given that language laws are 
the result of self-government powers (the outcome), and not an a priori requirement 
for fairness, self-governing bodies should be authorized to pass whatever language 
laws they deem necessary (within the limits of democratic rules). But that would 
suppose that (a) common language(s) are necessary resources for self-government; 
and (b) that language(s) per se ought to be protected, over individuals as equal 
bearers of rights. Neither is true, as Bauböck admits himself (Bauböck 2015b: 221– 
222). It would also suppose that there is a conceptual link between democratic 
politics and a common language. It may be true empirically that it is easier to fully 
participate in the democratic debate when mastering the common tongue (although 
many multilingual countries manage very well), but a common language is neither 
  
a necessary nor a sufficient condition for lively democratic deliberation as we have 
argued above. 
But overall, his account is consistent with our argument: admission of immigrants 
should be granted without pre-entry proficiency tests, but once admitted, immigrants 
and applicants for citizenship should have a  right to language training, in order   
to take part in the self-governing polity. This right is purely instrumental or 
consequential in the sense that membership in the self-governing body (whether  
as residents18 or as citizens) enables them to alter, influence, and shift language 
preferences (through municipal arrangements or general laws). In other words, 
language skills are political enabling skills, and not cultural admission tests or 
means to verify the compatibility of the migrant’s language background with the 
host society’s linguistic values. It is consequently a right for all immigrants to access 
the common good of language as an enabling skill. 
What about the subsequent application for citizenship? We argued that natural- 
ization should occur without language testing or attendance in language classes 
after a period of residency, the duration of which should be kept relatively short. 
Residents who wish to take up the citizenship of their host society should be 
welcomed without skepticism and helped in  all  possible ways, but the  situation 
is necessarily asymmetrical. In accordance with his social membership principle, 
Carens (2013: 60) argues along these lines: 
One may wish and hope that citizens will be well informed, but it is unreasonable to  
insist on knowledge of the dominant language for the sake of an idealized form of 
political information that typical native citizens do not possess. [ . . .  ] After several years 
of residence, ten at the most in my view, any language requirement should be set aside. 
Requiring immigrants to pass tests of linguistic capacity and civic knowledge as a condition 
of naturalization is ultimately unjust. 
In short, either we argue in favor of mandatory citizenship independently from 
the interests of individuals or groups to acquire citizenship because citizenship is 
not only a right and a duty but a significant burden, and hence abolish the category 
of long-term residents,19 or we acknowledge that there is nothing wrong with 
asymmetrical situations, as long as states do not pursue nationalistic and exclusive 
policies (a certain form of thin nationalism may be a side effect but should not be 
the main purpose (Tamir 1993)). 
Mandatory attendance in language classes (a condition waived after a period of 
residency) may still seem too paternalistic a policy for true liberals. But combined 
 
 
18See Bauböck (2015a) on multilevel citizenship: birthright citizenship and residence-based 
membership. 
19Because the alternative to mandatory citizenship, according to Helder De Schutter and Lea Ypi 
(2015: 15), “is not to have no linguistic or cultural others; the alternative is having a group of non- 
citizen linguistic or culturally others [ . . .  ]. Those who defend harsher citizenship acquisition rules 
oversee the result: not the absence of immigration, but the presence of more non-citizen immigrants 
[ . . .  ].” The authors also suggest that it is wrong to make democratic equality dependent on the 
contingency of immigrant’s interests. The duty to take up citizenship should be a general rule in 
order to avoid a “life as a permanent guest.” 
 
 
with a series of services, incentives, and compensations, we believe that mandatory 
attendance can be justified. If the classes are free of charge and taught by qualified 
instructors, either in specific locations easily accessible (in schools, e.g., for parents 
with children, or even in joint classes with the children if the parents need 
alphabetization; on the workplace with specific agreements from employers) or 
possibly via the internet, costs and burdens would be significantly lowered and 
learning would be facilitated, especially when combined with other social practices 
and interactions. 
 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
Language requirements are justifiable under a specific balance of four provisos: (1) 
the way language skills affect economic integration and employability (a utilitarian 
perspective), (2) expected benefits of a common language for  the  public culture 
of the host country (a more substantive or axiological perspective), (3) the way in 
which language skills affect political rights (a parity of participation perspective), 
and (4) the way in which specific language requirements affect self-respect and 
parity of esteem (Van Parijs 2011) and what kind of linguistic arrangements offer a 
significant realm of choice and of opportunities (a good life perspective). 
Let’s check to conclude whether the type of thin language requirement we argued 
for is consistent with these provisos: (1) economic integration and employability 
would certainly be enhanced, especially if language classes are taught in a com- 
prehensive way and in adapted locations. (2) The benefits for the public culture of 
the host society are instrumental, political, and moral. The communicative value  
of a common language is  instrumental. The political value refers to  the ability   
of participating in the self-governing polity in  the usual tongue of the debates.  
We should not forget that politics is about more than words uttered in the right 
language: language courses taught in a comprehensive way are avenues into the 
history, the culture, and the institutions of the receiving state. The moral value of  
a common idiom can be captured by the “existential threat” Andrew Shorten refers 
to: ongoing immigration in the absence of language learning may have significant 
effects on the national distinctiveness people are legitimately attached to (Shorten 
2010: 108). One can also argue that equality in language(s) is a moral attribute of 
political communities or that oldcomers expect newcomers to go through the same 
learning process and that  a  common language simply increases  social  cohesion. 
(3) Whether language skills affect parity of participation is less evident; however, 
the fact that only full citizenship allows the newcomers to participate in making 
and altering the laws, and consequently language policies, combined with enhanced 
communication skills, tends to prove that language skills are not a condition for 
participation (instrumental language rights such as translation services could be 
provided, knowing that these cannot encompass too broad a range of languages) but 
certainly a condition for a more efficient and a less mediated participation. (4) As 
for parity of esteem, a linguistic arrangement that respects the linguistic identity of 
  
migrants, provides transitory instrumental services, and offers free language training 
in the receiving state’s language without hampering other social goods or economic 
opportunities safely passes the test. 
The argument we offer about  language  training  as  a  right  combines  both 
the republican ideal of a contract  and  the  liberal  logic  of  testing  and  avoids 
the corresponding problems we have identified. We are aware of the risk that 
transnational elites or cultural minority ghettos with individuals reluctant to learn 
the polity’s language(s) will remain.20 That is why we remain committed to the 
republican ambition to create a contractual political community of citizens. This 
remains relevant and could be enforced through mandatory attendance to language 
courses. Immigrants may require the necessary means to achieve their integration 
and claim protection from (linguistic) domination; in that sense, language training 
(in which beneficial socializing side effects might occur) takes on its full meaning 
when the newcomer is actually in contact with native speakers. On the other hand, 
the liberal logic may correct paternalistic policies (or the positive liberty claim) a 
republic imposes on newcomers: language courses must not necessarily be validated 
by a formal evaluation21 and should be justified in the name of individual autonomy 
rather than in the name of loyalty to a set of predetermined values. Language 
remains a sufficiently thin and (eventually) enabling skill a liberal state is justified 
to  require (e.g., in  the name of the value of education), as  opposed to  cultural   
or historical pre-entry knowledge. The ideal  objectivity and  neutrality of  tests,  
as opposed to their costly, biased, and inefficient nature, should be dropped to 
reconsider language not as a means to control boundaries and define communities 
but as a tool to foster democratic participation of future citizens. 
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